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THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

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Abstract

National security policy has been a major concern of the country since India gained independence in 1947. After the India-China-Pakistan tri-war, India became more concerned about its security in the international scene. To secure a safe internal as well as external environment for a country, it was necessary to provide military and economic security to the people, therefore to prevent nuclear war, for national security, to become a nuclear self-sufficient country so that it can be strengthened in the international environment. He did his first nuclear test in the year 1974, the main purpose of which was to make the world aware that now India is also a nuclear power. Scientific knowledge knows, but in the year 1998, India again conducted a nuclear test.

[**Keywords**: Considerations for security Influence of Political prestige Economic benefits, Domestic Compulsions Indian Nuclear Program]

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Introduction

National security has been a major concern of policy makers since India gained independence in 1947. After the Indo-China war of 1962, India became more concerned about its security in the international scene. To secure a safe internal as well as external environment for a country it is necessary to provide military and economic security to the people. Economic security of a country acts as a pillar of national security as it is financially self-sufficient. The country stands firmly in the international environment. It is possible that after independence, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru highlighted its importance. Economic policies for India's foreign policy. He defined his views in the following words, "Talking about foreign policies and we come to the house, these are not just empty struggles on the chessboard. There are all kinds of things behind them. Ultimately, Foreign policy is the result of economic policy, and unless India develops its economic policy properly, its foreign policy is ambiguous; the new definition of security is not only limited to hard power and diplomacy but is now referred to as economic security. India's turbulent economic situation will provide better opportunities in both internal and external security environment India conducted the first nuclear test in the year 1974, the main objective of which was to make the world aware that now India is also a nuclear power. Scientific knowledge knows, but in the year 1998 India again conducted a new series of nuclear tests and formally declared its status as a nuclear weapon power under the government of the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Security from China and Pakistan nuclear weapons to fight threats The discovery was a necessary step. China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 and Pakistan did it in 1998, when India conducted its nuclear tests. This situation made security concerns more worrisome for India as India failed to obtain nuclear security guarantees from the United States and Britain during the 1960s, thus forcing India to enter the nuclear club in 2018. did.

The evolution of the origins of India's nuclear policy

On March 12, 1944, the groundwork for India's nuclear strategy initiative was set (Naeem Ahmed Salik n.d.). It was only a transient attempt. Origin of India's nuclear energy programme after independence: Due to the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1948, which can be traced back to, India began its nuclear programme and placed a strong emphasis on peaceful development, as seen by the exceptional courageous step taken by Homi Jehangir Bhabha. In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, the Indian government established the

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on August 10 to launch the nuclear power programme. The commission's first task was to determine if the nation's raw material resources were accessible. Since the AEC was created in 1948, all engineers and scientists working in the fields of instrumentation, metallurgy, materials science, reactor design, etc. In India, a powerful pro-nuclear weapons lobby began to emerge in the 1960s. There were two factors that led to the lobby's development. "First," China's crushing victory over India in the 1962 border conflict. Second, China made its first atomic bomb explosion in 1964. India's worries were heightened by China's nuclear test. Among other things, this uncertainty spurred India's nuclear armament programme.

The only goals of India's nuclear research and development efforts are benign ones. But in reality, "the Indian nuclear programme has an aggressive purpose as well. US intelligence agencies argue that India has all the components needed to build a nuclear weapon, if necessary, within hours. Furthermore, India itself has nuclear weapons. " He denies having an arsenal. India's nuclear bomb-making capability is due to its extensive nuclear infrastructure (Zachary S. Davis, 1994).

The only goals of India's nuclear research and development efforts are benign ones. But in truth, "Additionally, the Indian nuclear programme serves an aggressive objective. According to US intelligence agencies, India has all the materials on hand to quickly and easily construct a nuclear weapon. Additionally, India possesses nuclear weapons of its own." He denies possessing a weaponry. India's massive nuclear infrastructure is what allows it to produce nuclear weapons (Zachary S. Davis, 1994).

Factors of Indian Nuclear Programme

There are four major factors that compel India to expand its nuclear programme. who led the US, former USSR, UK, France and China to launch the Absolution Nuclear Program. they are:

(a). Considerations for security

(b). Influence of Political prestige

(c). Economic benefits,

(d). Domestic Compulsions

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(a) Considerations for security

"The state's defence policy is derived from calculations and considerations." These include, among other aspects, the country's location and its relationships with its neighbours; the governance system; potential challenges to the country's territorial integrity; and the state's future involvement in politics. Another issue is that communist China is very close to India geographically. India lost to China in the 1962 border skirmish, which raised tensions between the two nations and demonstrated China's military readiness. (1999, George Perkovic) China conducted a nuclear test two years after the battle, which led Indian policymakers to doubt the rationality of their country's nuclear policies. (2000) Joyce Battle. It is unsafe to cross India's border with China and Pakistan. Along the border with these states, particularly with India and Pakistan, there is tension. In 1995–1996 both nations made significant efforts to ease the tension. But for the years 1996–1997, India's defence spending climbed by 8%. (Dawn: 1996). Among Asia's growing nations, China and India are particularly well-known for their leadership. South Asia's largest power is India. Pakistan, however, contests India's influence in South Asia. Pakistan's security is considered as having China's assistance. In order to keep India competitive with China, the pro-nuclear lobby in India demands that the government develop nuclear weapons. 1984 (Akhtar Ali).

Demanding a separate nuclear arsenal to protect India from Chinese coercion and to address the issue of nuclear weapons production's high costs by lowering spending on conventional forces (Zeba Moshawar: 1991). Collective security is not a tenet of this worldview. That instead of saving India when it was in jeopardy, the superpowers helped the states instead India will have to choose to use nuclear weapons if it must defend its national interests. In a presentation submitted at the 12th Pugwash Conference in January 1964, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha gave his views. "While nuclear weapons offer absolute deterrent, conventional weapons can only offer relative deterrence" (Zeba Moshevar: 1991). In the end, the Atomic Hawks were persuasive. Collective security is not a tenet of this worldview. That instead of saving India when it was in jeopardy, the superpowers helped the states instead India will have to choose to use nuclear weapons if it must defend its national interests. In a presentation submitted at the 12th Pugwash Conference in January 1964, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha gave his views. "While nuclear weapons offer absolute

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deterrent, conventional weapons can only offer relative deterrence" (Zeba Moshevar: 1991). In the end, the Atomic Hawks were persuasive. MP from India The employment of nuclear technology is something that MPs from many political parties share similar opinions on. For instance, in the 1965.

(b) Influence of Political prestige

India sees itself as a dominant force in the nations of South Asia. It wants to play a far bigger leadership role than just in South Asia. India views itself as the logical heir to the culture of South Asia due to its sizable population and geographical growth. With this strategy, the Indian ruling class is compelled to take a significant leadership position in Asia and Africa's emerging nations. India became one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement because of this. India views nuclear technology as a means for achieving greatness. The US "did not recognise China until it criticised the US while showing its nuclear gadget," India will surely become a nuclear power if it does so, claim nuclear hawks. Nuclear weapons are frequently viewed as a sign of modernity in less developed nations. because having nuclear weapons will give them the ability to sway some global events in their favour. The most glaring example of nationalistic nationalism is possibly the Indian situation. "Building bombs! Building bombs! Building bombs! Bomb-making! Bomb-making! Bomb-making! Bomb-making! Bomb-making! Bomb-making

C) Economic Factors

A significant nation with a sizable young population is India. It is undergoing the urbanisation and industrialisation processes. Only nuclear energy can supply all of India's energy demands. where the hydropower producing sources are spread far from industrial hubs. In addition to this, monsoon rains determine how much water flows through major rivers. The eastern part of India has most of the country's coal reserves. Huge expenses are incurred while moving significant amounts of coal from the coal mines to the power plants. Areas greater than 1,300 kilometres from coal mines cannot have an economically sustainable coal source, according to G. Mirchandam (1981). So, in these places, using nuclear technology for power generation would be more effective.

In India's economy, agriculture is a crucial industry. It has been discovered that nuclear radiation technology is quite successful in solving some of the biggest issues facing the agricultural industry. To guarantee consistency in the sheet thickness of various materials,

like cardboard, plastic, paper, or metal, radio-isotopes can be utilised. Additionally, radio-isotope traces are used in the research of subsurface water, the propagation of light, and in the medical industry.

(d). Domestic Compulsion

To understand the internal pressure on the nuclear sector in India, one must examine all facets of Indian society. One of the most potent pressure groups in Indian society is the scientific community. They support the production of nuclear weapons. Numerous Lok Sabha MPs consistently argue that India should end its nuclear weapons development. The nuclear problem has been a central topic of public discourse since 1964. The average person supports nuclear weapons. The discussion on nuclear power has been ongoing in public since it first started in private in bureaucratic circles years ago. Initial participants in the internal discussion tended to include nuclear experts, members of the civilian intelligence community, and the Indian Foreign Office. He didn't have a lot of strength. But as the voyage progressed, his influence grew. He didn't have a lot of strength. But as time went on, his impact grew (Joseph Goldblatt, 1985).

The pro-nuclear weapons faction has grown as a result of the political leadership transition. The younger generation of politicians who joined the Congress Party with Indira Gandhi and the youth movements of socialist parties publicly supported the nuclear option in the 1960s (Joseph Goldblatt: 1985). The nuclear issue gives political parties a reason to exist. The ruling party supports the development of nuclear capability. By doing this, they shift the public's focus away from internal pressure and undesirable development. It is vehemently contended that technical advancements' wide exposure might allay predicted public outrage and afford the administration some time.

Since 1962, India has had very few public choices that were not motivated by emotion. It makes no sense for the majority to believe that the 1964 explosion in China was not intended for India. China's explosion was carried out to provide it a competitive advantage over the US and the former USSR. This had a direct bearing on the issue of China's standing as a global superpower and its assertion of its legitimate membership as a permanent member of the Security Council. India worries that China may use atomic weapons to attack it. It is illogical. In contrast to India, China did not need nuclear weapons for defence. They possess sufficient traditional military might to destroy India. This has a direct bearing on China's claim to be a legitimate international power and to a

permanent seat on the Security Council. India worries that China would attack it with nuclear weapons. It doesn't make sense. Comparatively speaking to India, China did not require nuclear weapons for defence. They are capable of defeating India with conventional military power. Hasan Askari Rizvi, 1975 However, the pro-nuclear camp in India has always contended that China's nuclear arsenal may be used against India. Because of this propaganda, the average Indian today believes that India's sovereignty is closely related to its access to nuclear weapons. Back then,

Indian Nuclear Program

In his book Nuclear Observations: Historic Observations Promoted in NTI, Gaurav Kampani describes the first attempts by India to start a nuclear programme, stating that "India's nuclear programme was conceived by influential people in the pre-independence era." This was done by a small group of scientists who recognised the value of nuclear energy and convinced the political leaders of the Indian National Congress to allocate funds for the programme (Gaurav Kampani, 2007).

As previously stated, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, who formed the "Institute of Fundamental Research" with assistance from the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust, organised to have India's nuclear programme launched long before the country gained its independence. In a letter to the Trust, Dr. Bhabha stated: "When nuclear power production has been properly implemented, India would not have to travel overseas for its specialists, but to prepare them at hand, in a few decades from now." It will occur. (1999, George Perkovic).

"I trust that Indian scientists would employ nuclear force for a positive cause," remarked Jawaharlal Nehru. However, if India feels threatened, it will unavoidably try to defend itself using all available means. Jawaharlal Nehru in particular had a public and outspoken position against nuclear weapons among the Indian leaders of independent India. But Nehru, who was a modernist as well, saw the importance of nuclear technology for advancing the country (Itty Abraham, 1998). There are three periods in the development of the Indian nuclear programme. The development of infrastructure and the non-militaristic application of nuclear technology were the primary concerns of the first phase. The second phase emphasised the modifications to India's nuclear strategy. Phase III verified India. The second phase emphasised the modifications to India's nuclear strategy. Phase III verified India's ability to produce nuclear technology.

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First Phase-Nehru Era

In 1948, the Indian government enacted the Atomic Energy Act. This led to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, which was led by Dr. Bhabha, on August 19, 1948. (Norman Brown: 1972). In 1954, India founded a multifunctional centre for nuclear research and development at Trombay, which is today known as the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in honour of its creator. Since its inception, this centre has made a significant contribution to science and development in India. It now ranks among the top technological institutions. Apsara, a pool-style reactor developed with British aid in 1955, was the center's first significant undertaking. This was only the beginning, as Canada eventually agreed to provide India the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR) following long talks. 2007; The U.S., the Canada-India reactor, the 1 megawatt Aspara Research Reactor, and the first reactor in India The rationale for India's desire for nuclear weapons The reactor's layout was perfect for producing plutonium that might be used in weapons. The plutonium used in India's initial nuclear test in 1974 was generated by CIRUS (Baker Spring and Dana Robert Dillon, 2006). Despite the US's consent to cooperate on the CIRUS project on the condition that the reactor would only be used for peaceful purposes, there were no international safeguards in place to control and monitor the use of the transferred technology. Two further research reactors were later built by India on their own and went into service in 1961 and 1972, respectively (Mirchandani: 1981). An agreement for the construction of the Tarapur nuclear power plant was struck by the US and India in i.e., their programme was created to supply the population with energy rather than to build nuclear weapons. India underwent developments in the 1960s that inspired the creation of nuclear weapons. Even though he favoured disarmament, Prime Minister Nehru was concerned about China's nuclear weapons programme. After his passing, India started to create the programme to counter the Chinese programme and its 1964 testing. (2008) Joyce Battle Additionally, this changed as a result of the 1962 conflict with China, which changed Indian perceptions of nuclear weapons. In a genuine sense, this battle was the catalyst for the events that led to the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. (2002) John W. Garver

Second Phase-Post1964 Era

The late Prime Minister Nehru remained steadfast nearly his whole reign. India was worried about the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. However, the promise was weakened by China's first nuclear test in 1964, which was carried out by his successor

Lal Bahadur Shastri just five weeks after Nehru passed away. "I cannot claim that the existing policy (for nuclear pacifism) is deeply embedded, that it cannot be separated, and that it will not be modified," the new prime minister stated (Bhabhani Sen Gupta: 1983). Ironically, India, the global peace envoy, has to leave the door open for the use of nuclear weapons.

During this time, a significant nuclear hawk movement began to grow. They belonged to all walks of life. Raj Krishna, Shishir Gupta, Subrahmanyam, India's nuclear weapons development was sponsored by Y.B. Chavan and Vikram Sharabhai. In 1968, he was effective in influencing public opinion in India, where 79 percent of people supported the nuclear option (Chris Smith: 1994).

Trombay saw the opening of a reprocessing facility for the separation of plutonium in 1965. It was the first facility of its sort built outside of nuclear-armed nations. This locally constructed facility gave India both reactor fuel and explosives (Naeem Ahmed Salik, n.d.). Indian scientists were aware of the dual use of plutonium when they began research on it.

India's Nuclear Explosion

The "peaceful nuclear explosion," which took place on May 18, 1974, is the most significant aspect of India's nuclear programme. This explosion, which had an explosive force of 10–15 kilotons, took place at a depth of 100 metres. A fissile substance was utilised with plutonium. The explosion left a 150-meter-wide crater behind (Naeem Ahmed Salik: n.d.). The explosion was the expected result of a shift in nuclear strategy that Shastri first hinted to in November 1964. (Shyam Bhatia: 1979). Indian authorities referred to the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE). Even if economically developed countries could argue otherwise, the prime minister of India reiterated that "new nuclear know-how and technology will help to India's prosperity." (1999; Perkovic). This explosion, which had an explosive force of 10–15 kilotons, took place at a depth of 100 metres. A fissile substance was utilised with plutonium. The explosion left a 150-meter-wide crater behind (Naeem Ahmed Salik: n.d.). The explosion was the expected result of a shift in nuclear strategy that Shastri first hinted to in November 1964. (Shyam Bhatia: 1979). Indian authorities referred to the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE). Even if economically developed countries could argue otherwise, the prime minister of India

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Initial reactions to the Indian PNE from other countries were conflicting. The NAM member nations recognised the scientific and technological capability that made it possible to perform the test. Congratulatory letters were issued from France to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. United States Congratulatory letters were issued from France to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. In an effort to halt India's nuclear aspirations, the United States responded quickly and imposed sanctions on India that were intended to restrict India's access to nuclear materials and technology. (1999; Virginia I. Foran).

The consequences of this PNE were uneven in India because scientists wanted to keep testing but the government refrained due to competing local priorities and global concerns. (1999; Perkovic).

The Indian debate about nuclear weapons between the 1960s and 1990s did not consider how nuclear weapons could be used within the framework of the Indian strategy. The arguments and proposals largely revolved around whether India should go nuclear, not what India should do with nuclear weapons. (Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu: 2004) In the 1980s, K. Some Indian strategists like Subramaniam and General Sundarji began writing about what nuclear weapons could be useful for. This view of the political utility of nuclear weapons is also reflected in the arguments for granting strategic autonomy to the political space and nuclear weapons, which were argued by former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. Not surprisingly, the Indian nuclear deterrent eventually insisted on smaller numbers and retaliation capacity, rather than creating a deterrent force similar to other

nuclear powers. India experienced serious, complicated strategic issues between 1980 and 1984. An external environment that would need a buildup in the nuclear arsenal was established by US military assistance to Pakistan during the Afghan War and Pakistan's nuclear weapons development. Gandhi declined to approve another nuclear bomb test or other steps to militarise India's nuclear capacity in the face of pressure from the nuclear establishment and military voices calling for the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Pride played a significant role in India's choice to build the bomb. "We don't want to extort you. "An Indian will talk straight and walk straight when we have a bomb," declared a BJP spokeswoman in 1993. "Nuclear weapons would give us pride, power, and status." David Perkovic (1998) Living close to nuclear-armed China and nuclear-aspiring Pakistan provided another another motivation for the development of nuclear weapons. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a BJP leader, swore in 1996 that the country of India would not compromise on its security or sovereignty, saying, "We don't want to see India cut off from Pakistan or China because we didn't have deterrent nuclear power." (Mahesh Mehta and Krishna M. Bhatta: n.d.) In May 1998, two nuclear test rounds were approved by Vajpayee's party.

After 24 years, India once again astounded the globe. On May 11, 1998, Buddha Purnima Day, India shocked the world once more by performing three nuclear tests. This time, it had been 24 years. One had the same plutonium as the test in 1974. The second was a hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb, and the third was a low-yield weapon with a wider range of uses—mostly a tactical weapon. A pull operated each of the three gadgets.

Two further weapons were tested in Pokhran on May 13, 1998, which was two days later. Through these experiments, Indian scientists had access to the most recent advancements in nuclear weaponry technology, including the capacity to carry out sub-critical tests or tests using computer simulations in the lab.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the prime minister, subsequently declared: "India is today a nuclear weapon state." India's Times, 1998 India's Times, 1998 Following the May 11 tests, Brijesh Mishra, the Prime Minister's Special Secretary, added: "These tests have demonstrated that India has a proven capacity for an armed nuclear programme." Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission R. Chidambaram stated: "The bombs tested at Pokhran

were solely for defence purposes." (Times of India: 1998) This time, there was no mention of how harmless the nuclear testing were.

The Western nations perceived India's revelation that it had nuclear weapons as an effort by India to assert itself as a significant state. Particularly US policymakers counselled India that there was no connection between becoming the dominating nation and having nuclear weapons. In an effort to strengthen his position and national authority, US President Clinton claimed that given India's democratic traditions, going nuclear is not the way to "greatness." (1998, Times of India). "Indicators that tell us India is interested in the possibility for thermonuclear weapons," said CIA Director William H. Webster in 1989 during testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. (1989; William Webster). After agreeing to create the bomb, India made quick progress, especially during the time when the "Indicators that tell us India is interested in the possibility for thermonuclear weapons," said CIA Director William H. Webster in 1989 during testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. (1989; William Webster). After agreeing to construct the bomb, India advanced quickly, particularly when the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was in power. The nation possessed the ability to use fighter planes to deliver nuclear bombs by May 1994. Indian scientists were able to create a nuclear bomb in 1996 that could be attached to the Prithvi-1 ballistic missile used by the army.

Only 50 of the 70 constructed nuclear bombs in the Indian arsenal, according to Robert Norris and Hans Christensen, are completely operational. (Norris, Robert S.; Christensen, Hans M.: n.d.) in India (Norris, Robert S.; Christensen, Hans M.: n.d.) In addition to calling for nuclear testing and worldwide disarmament "based on the principles of universality, non-discrimination, and effective compliance," India has a stated nuclear first-use policy. advocates. calls for termination. The advocacy is ongoing. Only four of the nation's 13 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards despite the fact that it is a member of the organisation. India, however, has not ratified either the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Current Nuclear potentiality of India

In addition to continuing to build more advanced long-range ballistic missiles, India now possesses a strategic weapons capabilities that comprises both air-deliverable nuclear

warheads and ballistic missiles. The "most ambitious missile programme in the developing countries" has been built by India. Currently, this development programme has two significant missile types in its arsenal: "Prithvi SRBM and Agni." (2008) David J. Chrisman

From 150 km to 750 km, Prithvi has evolved four different ranges and capabilities. The second missile system is called Agni, a medium-to-long-range ballistic missile that was initially tested in 1989 and is thought to have a range of up to 2,500 km. There are now several types of fire in use, under testing, and in manufacturing. Agni, the first missile is a two-stage road-mobile ballistic missile that can conduct nuclear war for the military that is solid/liquid fuelled. The projected missile range with a 1,000 kilogramme payload is 860 km. Agni II carries a payload of 1,000 kg and an estimated range of 2,500 kilometres. (2008) David J. Chrisman The third missile in the Agni series, Agni III, is the heaviest and is thought to have a 3,500 km range. The missile has the greatest range, however it is considerably shorter than China's current long-range missiles.

In addition to debating the introduction of Missile Shield in 2010, India is actively testing new missiles. The Agni IV intercontinental ballistic missile from India is the first missile presently in development. There has been no evidence of the existence of this programme, expected to have a range of 12,000 kilometres. (2008) David J. Chrisman The PJ-10 BrahMos is an anti-ship/land target cruise missile that was created in collaboration with the Russian Federation. "India has been granted its long range missile with this one," It is anticipated that strike capabilities would significantly enhance.

In addition to its offensive capabilities, India is presently developing a defence plan to protect itself against missile launches into China or Pakistan. Within three years, a full ballistic missile defence system will be in place. 2010 (Steve Herman). Additionally, "India continues to investigate the prospects of acquiring technology and systems provided by numerous nations. Israel, the United States, and Russia. 2010 (Steve Herman)
Furthermore, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] estimates that India is on course to increase its nuclear arsenal despite the global drop of nuclear weapons. According to the SIPRI research, "India is developing and deploying new types

of nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as improving its military fissile material manufacturing capabilities, to increase the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal" (Sushil K Singh: 2013). The lowest credible deterrence and no first use of nuclear weapons are the cornerstones of Indian nuclear doctrine.

Nuclear Weapons Stock

By the end of 1995, according to estimates by David Albright, Frances Barhout, and William Walker, India had enough plutonium on hand to make around 65 nuclear weapons, and by the year 2000, that number would rise to 85–90. (1990; J. Carson Mark). The real plutonium stockpile in India is adequate for 80–90 nuclear bombs, therefore their estimate of 330 kg of plutonium by the end of 1995 may be as low as 30%. According to estimates based on Albright's statistics, India may have enough plutonium by 2005 and 2010 for 70 to 105 and 90 to 125 nuclear bombs, respectively. For more than 20 years, India has possessed dependable nuclear-capable aircraft to deliver these nuclear warheads to the target. As of 2003, the MIG-29, MIG-27, and SU-30MKS make up India's nuclear delivery system. The Jaguar was supplied by England, the Mirage 2000 by France, and the supply came from Russia. Indian missiles are nuclear-capable. The 200 km-range Prithvi-I short-range missiles were first tested in February 1996. (P. R. Singh and Dr. Inderjit Singh 2009) It is said to be at a "advanced developmental stage. (P. R. Singh and Dr. Inderjit Singh, 2009) Gaya's first study, which ended in failure in April 2000, In September 2001, a successful test firing took place. The medium-range Agni missile series is owned by India. Agni-1 was put to the test between 1989 and 1994. The range of this missile has been the subject of several reports. inside the range. 3500 km" ranges from 42 to 2500 km with 500 kg ordnance and 1600 km with 1000 kg ordnance. In April 1999, the AGNI-II (range 2500–3000 km) underwent its initial test. In January 2002, the AGNI (range 700–750 km) underwent its initial test. The first test of the 3500+ kilometre Agni-3 took place in 2007. For them, there is also a scheme for land-based distribution. Additionally, India has a programme known as Advanced Technology Vessels for submarine-based nuclear bomb delivery (ATVs). This project has been in construction for more than three decades and is still not finished.

In summary,

Initiated by Dr. Bhabha in the early 1950s, the Indian nuclear energy programme has been successfully developed and implemented thanks to both domestic and Western assistance, elevating the nation to an exclusive group of nations with cutting-edge nuclear technology. made has been. has been added dated, nuclear power is equipped with extensive capabilities in all facets of nuclear energy and is poised for a significant growth programme.

"As the quotation at the start of the essay implies, the nuclear agreement is a key component of India's New Ambition programme. In essence, India's nuclear policy presently revolves on the intersection of energy, economic development, and standing as a major power. The agreement's primary goal will be accomplished: India will be acknowledged as a responsible nuclear weapon state, which will lead to the worldwide recognition that has long been sought for.

India's nuclear strategy has steadily changed over time. There are therefore few local political or global reasons to anticipate a swift shift in India's nuclear strategy. However, India is wary about expanding its nuclear arsenal, and on the other hand, is not expected to dramatically expand its nuclear arsenal or undertake further nuclear tests. With ballistic missiles with a range of more than 6000 km and maybe one or two long-range submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles, India could be anticipated to progressively expand the size of its arsenal over the coming decade.

Last but not least, it is significant to highlight that India has shown moderation in its nuclear strategy in order to forge positive ties with significant nuclear non-proliferation regime members like the US. India's primary goal is to become a powerful nation with advanced nuclear technology.

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